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DISSENTING REMARKSt
by ROBERT E. JONAS*
In view of the inability of the translators to reach an
agreement about certain key ideas in the West German opinion
or about the contents of the Introduction, the reader may find
it helpful to consider a different interpretation, as well as some
supplemental considerations.

I. THE GERMAN OPINION
1. Exactability: I believe that this rather subtle concept
can best be understood in the following terms. The Court,
by way of providing the legislator with guidelines for his statutes
sets about differentiating cases of abortion which must be visited
with penal retribution from those in which the state can substitute counseling as a method of fulfilling its obligation to protect
life.1
The criterion by which one separates the two sets of cases
is that of "exactability," "or whether the carrying of the pregnancy to term can be compelled with the penal law."'2 In discussing "exactability" one must keep in mind that the Court
clearly affirms (as do the Dissent and the representatives of the
government) that the state can never abdicate its responsibility
to protect human life 3 -its very raison d'etre. Neither the German constitution nor reason however, supposes that the threat
of punishment before and its reality after an act of killing
(Tbtenhandlung 4) are the only, effective methods of protecting
life.
The Court is saying that abortion cannot be legal because
every unborn child has a right to life which the state must
protect.5 How unborn life is to be protected is first to be
decided by the legislature and the method of protection need not
be a penal sanction. 6 For practical purposes, the Court holds
that there are two principal means of protecting unborn life; the
t Hereinafter referred to as Remarks.
* B.A., St. Louis University (1965); J.D., Notre Dame (1970). Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. Translation at 605-06. See also id. at 645.
2. Id. at 647.
3. Id. at 642.

4. Id. at 645.
5. Id. at 637, 644.
6. Id. at 645, 650.
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first is the criminal penalty and the second is education and
assistance in the individual case. "Exactability" is the judicially
developed criterion by which the legislature may decide which
method of protection is appropriate to a corresponding group of
cases. Exactable conduct is conduct that can or should be
required or exacted by the penal law. I say judicially developed
criterion because although the word zummutbar (exactable) is
prominent in the language of the statute, it is nowhere defined
in the law itself.
The German Court therefore divides abortions into two sets
of cases: those in which the woman's duty to respect the right
to life of the unborn is exactable and those in which it is not.7
Formulated from the state's viewpoint, the first class of cases is
comprised of those in which the state must protect life with the
sharpest of its weapons, the penal sanction. The second classification of cases contains those in which the state should fulfill
its obligation to protect by instructing the woman that abortion
is the killing of a human being; by informing her that it is an
act which may be physically dangerous to her; and by offering
her every financial, social, and human assistance to turn her
8
from the act.
How and by what standard(s) does the Court decide which
cases are exactable and which are subjects for the educational
and assistance approach?
The Basic Law guarantees to the woman certain rights, a
right to life, the right to physical inviolability, and the right to
free development of her personality. These are also rights which
belong to the unborn child.9 Now, if the decision for an abortion should proceed from a reason which has no recognition in
the eyes of the Basic Law, from a "value" such as convenience,
(there is no right to convenience in the Basic Law), legally there
is no doubt about the result. 10 There is not even a contest.
The legally protected rights of the child en ventre sa mere take
precedence over a legal non-right.
The Court first encounters a real contest and a legal problem when the decision for an abortion emanates from a reason
which is within a constitutionally protected legal sphere of the
woman. To resolve the conflict of rights encountered here, legal
rights, values and obligations must be balanced each against the
other; their nature and origin must be ascertained; precedence
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 647-49.
See also discussion beginning at 651 id.
at 638, 642-43.
at 647, 662. See id. at 643, 649.
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and subordination must be assigned, and finally one right
emerge victorious. 11
In an abortion, the unborn child's right to life, the most
important and fundamental of all human rights (as the Court
affirms passim) is always in the balance. Viewed solely from
a legal point of view, except when the life of the pregnant woman
is at stake and the right to life is pitted against right to life,
the legally protected values which she has to place on the other
side of the scale will necessarily be of lesser weight. Indeed,
the right to life might be compared to the scale itself rather than
any weight placed upon it, since the Court holds that the right
to life is the "living foundation"'12 of human dignity and of all
human rights. Thus, although the precedence of the right to
life is clearly recognized, lesser rights still exist and must, in
cases of conflict, be preserved to the extent possible. Therefore,
the West German Court holds that if the state can fulfill its
obligation to protect life through other measures, the penal law
may not be employed to exact from the woman respect for the
life of the fetus, if her decision proceeds from a reason which is
within a constitutionally protected area.' 3 Instead, the state
attempts to educate, assist and influence her to accept the child
on her personal responsibility.
2. Although the Court's holding that the Basic Law
guarantees the right to life of the unborn child precludes the
conclusion that unpunished abortions can be legal, one is still
faced with the question of the legal classification of abortions
for which the law prescribes only preventive counseling. For
the following reasons, I suggest that the act remains, although
unpunished, both criminal as well as illegal:
a. The sections under consideration (§§218 et seq.) are sections of the Penal Code, and the entire discussion revolves
around a penal law statute.
b. The statute itself as well as the opinion refers to the acts
merely as being "punishable" (strafbar) or "free of punishment"
(straflos).
c. One searches the opinion as well as the statutes in vain
for any statement that the termination of pregnancy is not
rechtswidrig,i.e., criminal.
d. According to one commentator, the idea of nicht
Zumutbarkeit goes to Schuld or "guilt" rather than the objec4
tive criminality of the act.'
11. Id. at 647-48.

12. Id. at 642.
13. See, e.g., id. at 609, Holding I.
14. See Schonke-Schroder, Strafgesetzbuch: Komnientar, 17 Auflage

(1974), MUnchen.
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e. Although I realize that this concept must seem somewhat
unusual to an American lawyer, it appears that the Parliament,
in the hope of creating greater utilization of the counseling,
legislated a kind of mandatory suspension of sentence for cases
where it was in fact utilized. Punishment is imposed, however,
if the counseling is not utilized.
3. This concept of preventive counseling is perhaps the most
original and unique contribution of the German constitutional
debate. It emanates not from the Court but from the Parliament. It is revised, amplified and strengthened by the Court.
The counseling envisaged by the Parliament in § 218c is twofold.
First, the pregnant woman must be instructed about the public
and private assistance available for mothers and children, especially assistance which facilitates the continuation of the pregnancy and the situation of mother and child. Second, she must
be counseled by a "physician."'5
It is important to note that the Constitutional Court does
not reject the concept of counseling as such, but rather introduces two modifying considerations. First, it points out that
there are some cases (the exactable) in which a penal sanction
which functions in part as a social condemnation of the act of
abortion, is required to fulfill the constitutional norm.16 The
didactic function of the law, the Court holds, is a very important element in the formation of a social conscience. The penal
sanction therefore, can never be repealed in toto without serious
disruptive effects.' 7 Second, the Court concludes that although
a properly structured counseling system could protect unborn
life,' 8 the system designed by the Federal Parliament does not
do so, for the reasons enumerated by the Court, principally
because it is not intensively oriented to the continuation of
the pregnancy and does not have the resources to offer actual
material assistance.' 9 Thus, any future regulation of abortion
in West Germany which incorporates pre-abortion counseling
must of necessity conform to the constitutional guidelines put
down by the Court.
The Court's critique of the counseling structured by the
Federal Parliament is premised in part on an attitude toward
the medical profession which is cautious at times and actually
sarcastic at others. 20 An extensive discussion of some reasons
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See § 218c of the Fifth Statute, Translation at 612.
Translation at 651.
Id. at 654-55.
Id. at 644.
See discussion beginning at 657 id.
Id.at 58-60.
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for the attitude drawn from historical experience to be found in
21
A Sign for Cain by Frederic Wertham, M.D.
The Court seems to accept the argument that counseling and
the penal sanction, as deterrent measures, are to some extent
mutually exclusive, 22 and for this perhaps, as well as other
reasons, does not seriously consider the possibility of employing
both, i.e., counseling before and punishment after abortion. That
utilization of both approaches is not actually self-defeating is
suggested by the fact that in the United States, since Roe and
Doe, the case loads of voluntary problem-pregnancy counseling
agencies may actually have decreased in relationship to the
number of abortions performed. 23 In other words, the absence
of a penal sanction after the fact in this country apparently has
not encouraged counseling.
Any potential tendency of the penal sanction to discourage
utilization of counseling might be minimized either by administering the program anonymously or by legally exempting the
counseling centers' records from scrutiny by police and prosecuting authorities. These are but two possible solutions.
Employing the vast resources of the state to save life through
a counseling and assistance program made available without
charge to all women with problem pregnancies is a humane
approach which in conjunction with a criminal penalty for abortion would probably guarantee effective protection both of
unborn life as well as maternal health. This supposes, of course,
that the counseling and social assistance would be, as the German
Court requires, intensively oriented to the continuation of the
pregnancy. In this country, enactment of both measures in conjunction with a human life amendment 24 would probably be
conducive to making such an amendment a lasting reform.
To those trained in Anglo-American jurisprudence, which
relies almost exclusively on punishment after the fact to enforce
legal norms, the concept of counseling before the fact must
appear novel. In any case, in view of the limited effectiveness
of penal sanctions unaccompanied by other measures, the applicability and value of counseling for this as well as other areas
of the penal law should certainly be considered.

21.

FREDRic WERTAM, A SIGN FOR CAIN

(1966).

22. The argument is made at Translation at 653-54. The theory of the

Court and the solution which it settles upon seem to imply concurrence.
23. Although there is little in the way of reliable and publicly available statistics on this point (the conclusion has been suggested to me
by those actively engaged in such counseling), the argument does not

stand or fall on the direction of contemporary social statistics. One of
the reasons counseling is not utilized to a greater extent is that it is not
sufficiently available.
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4. Albert Speer in his Erinnerungen makes the observation
that one of the great deficiencies of German education in the post
World War I era was its failure to inculcate a faculty for social
and political criticism. 25 Against this background, then, the
active participation in the parliamentary debate, as well as the
arguing of the decision by diverse, academically and legally
accredited members of German society, appears worthy of note.
There exists an unanimity among these parties as to first
principles which makes the entire abortion debate in West Germany appear somewhat unique. The majority of the Court, the
dissenting justices, the petitioners, the representatives of the government, and the drafters of the Fifth Statute, after years of
debate and "extraordinarily comprehensive" legislative proceedings, seem to concur in at least three basic premises: 1. The state
has an obligation to protect life, 2. that obligation extends to
the protection of unborn life, and 3. because human life is present
26
from implantation at latest.
It is also noteworthy that in a scientifically and philosophically sophisticated country such as West Germany, this latter
conclusion appears to have been taken as established by all parties and assumed to be the point of departure for the discussion.
Although the Court supports its conclusion with a reference to
the testimony of experts before the Federal Parliament, 27 one
can easily conclude from the tone of the proceedings as a whole
that the scientific testimony and conclusion did not come as a
surprise to anyone. As the dissent says,28 the argument is only
about how that life should be protected.
5. Against this background we are now in a position to
consider whether the Federal Parliament legislated "abortion on
demand" or "abortion on request with counseling." 29 The
24. One example of the wording of a proposed human life amendment to the United States Constitution can be found at S.J. Res. 141,
94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S18194 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1975).
The proposed amendment reads as follows:
'SECTION 1. With respect to the right to life, the word 'person',
as used in this article and in the fifth and fourteenth articles of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applies to all
human beings, irrespective of age, health, function, or condition of
dependency, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their
biological development.
'SEc. 2. No unborn person shall be deprived of life by any person: Provided, however, That nothing in this article shall prohibit
a law permitting only those medical procedures required to prevent
the death of the mother.
'SEC. 3. Congress and the several States shall have the power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation within their respective jurisdictions.'.
25. ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 34 et seq. (1970).

26. Translation at 623, 627, 637-38, 640, 642, 663, 672.

27. Id. at 637-38.
28. Id. at 663.
29. As stated in Introduction.
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inaccuracy of the description will be seen I think if the avowed
object and purpose of the Fifth Statute are considered. The
intention of the Parliament was to guarantee a more effective
protection of unborn life by substituting preventive counseling
for the penal sanction, to make abortion less rather than more
frequent.8 0 Abortion on demand or request as it exists in the
U.S. is just that, not an operation which can be obtained only
after medical and social counseling, which itself is penally enforced. The conclusion will not be otherwise, I believe, even if
one assumes that the pro-life attitude of the majority of Federal
Parliament is merely a tactical facade assumed for reasons of
expediency.
The question of the compatibility of the West German
Court's solution with an "indications solution" can be resolved
in a similar fashion. If one means that the Basic Law can be
construed to mean that in certain situations abortion need not
be punished, if the state employs other measures to protect life,
-that is one thing; but it is not an indications solution as the
term is customarily used in American law. The Court should
be taken to mean what it says: "[T]he protective duty of the
state is comprehensive."3 1
II. Roe AND Doe
In view of the fact that the Roe decision is the primary
analogate of Mr. Gorby's Introduction and its holding is presented without the benefit of the arguments made by the state
of Texas and the amici curiae in support of the constitutionality
of the Texas statute, some of those arguments should briefly be
summarized here, since I believe they represent the better
reasoning. The summary may also be of some practical use to
the American lawyer.
Summary of the argument in part:
Abortion is a civil rights issue. The right to life is the most
fundamental of human rights.8 2 As the Supreme Court has said
in another context, it is the "'right to have rights.'-13 It is
guaranteed in the Constitution3 4 and mentioned in the Declaration of Independence,"3 in light of which the Constitution may
30. Translation at 650.
31. E.g., id. at 642.
32. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 985.
33. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV.
35. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men."
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safely be read.36 The government of the United States as well
as of the states themselves are obligated to protect human life.
That obligation has been emphasized even in the case of convicted
37
felons.
The unborn child is a "person" within the meaning of the
Constitution and is included within the protection of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments and consequently is entitled to legal
protection. 38 The incongruity of a conclusion to the contrary
is emphasized by the fact that corporations are recognized as
legal persons. 39 A holding that the unborn child is not a legal
person might fairly be compared in soundness to the Dred
Scott case 4° which held the black man was not a citizen, or to
the non-personhood arguments of the U.S. Government in cases
41
involving the American Indian.
The amici in Roe and others have argued that human life,
according to scientific consensus, begins at conception, 42 that
a distinct human being is present from the onset of the preg43
viability, 44 nor birth 45
nancy and that neither quickening,
substantially alter the human life present from the beginning.
Even prescinding from these conclusions, the state has a compell46
ing interest in protecting fetal life.
As a fundamental, enumerated right necessary for ordered
liberty, it is contended that the right to life takes precedence
over the woman's right to privacy, which however genuine, is
not enumerated in the Constitution, was probably not within the
contemplation of the Founding Fathers and, as it developed his47
torically, was thought to be subordinate 'to the right to life.
It is further urged that since abortion as a medical procedure is more dangerous than childbirth physically and psycho36. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160
(1897).
37.
38.
Horan
39.
40.
41.
14,891)

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295-97 (1972).
See, e.g., ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 130 et seq. (Hilgers &
eds. 1972).
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific RR., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (No.
(C.C.D. Neb. 1879). See D. BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED
KNEE (1970), chapter entitled "Standing Bear Becomes a Person."
42. Hymie Gordon, Genetical, Social, and Medical Aspects of Abortion, SOUTH AFRICAN MED. J. 721-30 (1968). This conclusion was also
reached at the First International Conference on Abortion held in Washington, D.C. in 1967.
43. DAVENPORT HOOKER, THE PRENATAL ORIGIN OF BEHAVIOR (1952).
44. Address by Andre Hellegers, M.D., National Symposium on Abortion, May 15, 1970, Prudential Plaza, Chicago, Illinois.
45. DR. & MRS. J.C. WILLKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION (1971).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56, 159 (1973).

47. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 253 (1891).
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logically, the state has an interest in prohibiting abortion to
48
protect maternal health.
I hope that these incomplete considerations and sources will
assist in giving the attorney some insight into why the Roe and
Doe holdings have been so vigorously challenged and criticized
by legal scholars 49 and why they are the focal point of such
public controversy.
For the American lawyer litigating cases arising within the
areas of law affected by Roe and Doe, especially for the advocate
engaged in the increasing volume of litigation directed at limiting or bringing about a reversal of those decisions, the reasoning
and principles of the West German opinion will be of value. The
West German debate and its results may also assist the American judiciary in revising its premises and conclusions to conform
to the charter from which its authority is derived.
48. Thomas Hilgers, The Medical Hazards of Legally Induced Abor-

tion, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Hilgers & Horan eds. 1972).
49. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).

